Ethiopia and Sudan’s War: What Is Happening Across the Border?
Posted 7 Sep 2026 by Walaa Idris
Sudan’s war is increasingly difficult to describe as an internal conflict.
A new report from the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on Sudan provides further evidence of how deeply the conflict has extended beyond Sudan’s borders. The Panel states that Ethiopian territory has been utilised by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as part of the conflict’s wider regional networks.
Now, new satellite analysis from Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab has identified a significant build-up of military equipment at an Ethiopian National Defense Forces base in Asosa, close to Sudan’s Blue Nile region. Reuters
Between 23 and 28 August, Yale identified approximately 100 newly present light technical vehicles, around 15 vehicles consistent with armoured personnel carriers, mounted weapons and significant transport equipment. The researchers assessed that the vehicles could transport between 750 and 1,000 personnel.
The timing and location matter.
Asosa sits close to a Sudanese battlefield that has become increasingly important. Yale also notes previous claims that the RSF was resupplied through Asosa Airport during attacks around Kurmuk and Geisan.
What, then, is happening across this border?
This is not the first indication that Ethiopia may have become part of the conflict’s wider military infrastructure. Earlier reporting by Reuters described a covert facility in Ethiopia allegedly used to train RSF fighters. Yale has also previously documented military logistics activity at Asosa.
Taken together, these developments point to something Sudan Futures has repeatedly argued:
Sudan’s war cannot be understood solely by looking at what happens inside Sudan
.
The networks sustaining the conflict cross borders.
Weapons cross borders.
Money crosses borders.
Military technology crosses borders.
Fighters and logistical support cross borders.
And increasingly, the evidence suggests that some of the infrastructure supporting the war may sit outside Sudan itself.
That raises a wider question about international scrutiny.
Much attention has rightly been directed towards the Gulf, particularly allegations concerning external support for the RSF. But if the international community is serious about understanding and disrupting the networks sustaining Sudan’s war, scrutiny cannot stop at the most politically convenient places.
If military infrastructure on a neighbouring country’s territory may be connected to the conflict, what questions are being asked about it?
And perhaps more importantly:
If Sudan’s war is being sustained through networks that cross its borders, what responsibility do neighbouring states have to explain what is happening on their territory?
These are not questions about assigning collective blame to Ethiopia.
Nor should evidence be stretched beyond what it can establish.
They are questions about transparency, scrutiny and responsibility.
Sudan does not need more assumptions. It needs better questions.
The international community increasingly recognises that external support is helping sustain the war. The next step is to examine the networks behind that support with the same seriousness, wherever they lead.
The battlefield may be in Sudan.
But the war does not stop at Sudan’s borders.
And if that is true, neither should international scrutiny.
Resources,
1) UN Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Brigade-Size Support Assembled at Asosa
2) ENDF Base Associated with RSF Activity – Yale School of Public Health


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