There was a moment at Prime Minister’s Questions recently that I found genuinely troubling.

Andy Burnham was challenged over defence spending and the need to strengthen Britain’s national security.

His response was that the Government would support national security, but it could not come at the expense of social security.

Of course social security matters.

But I question the premise that these should be presented as competing forms of security.

Because without national security, what exactly are we securing?

We are living through the most dangerous period in Europe for generations. Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally changed the security environment. We face threats not only from conventional warfare, but from cyber-attacks, hostile states, attacks on critical infrastructure and increasing pressure on the alliances on which Britain has depended for decades.

The Government’s own Strategic Defence Review recognises the scale of that change.

So this is not an argument about whether we care about people who need support. We absolutely should.

It is an argument about the first responsibility of government: keeping the country and its people safe.

A secure society needs strong public services. It needs an effective social security system. But it also needs armed forces capable of defending the country when deterrence fails.

And that requires money.

Which brings me to a rather extraordinary question.

What changed?

In June, John Healey resigned as Defence Secretary because he believed the Government was not providing the resources that Britain’s defence required at a time of rising threats.

His resignation letter was remarkably clear. He said that the Prime Minister had been unable, and the Treasury unwilling, to commit the resources needed to defend the country. He warned that the funding settlement would reduce the readiness of our Armed Forces and increase the risk to personnel.

That was not the resignation of a minister who thought defence was a secondary issue.

Yet only weeks later, Andy Burnham appointed John Healey as his Chancellor of the Exchequer — the very minister responsible for the Government’s finances.

Burnham said he appointed him because of his “strong commitment to the defence of this nation.”

So I have a simple question:

If John Healey was right to resign because defence was not being funded adequately, why is the same urgency not reflected in the Government’s approach now?

The Prime Minister says the Government will reach 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035.

But threats do not arrive according to a Treasury timetable.

And John Healey himself argued that Britain should reach 3% by 2030 — not because 2030 was an arbitrary political target, but because of the deteriorating security environment facing the country.

This is where I believe the Conservative argument must be made clearly.

Defence is not a luxury. It is not an optional extra. And it cannot always be the first place governments look when difficult financial choices have to be made.

We should absolutely debate how much government spends, where that money comes from and how effectively it is used.

But we should also be honest about the world we now inhabit.

If we want Britain to remain a prosperous, free and secure democracy, we need the capability to defend it.

That means properly equipped Armed Forces.

It means credible deterrence.

It means supporting our NATO commitments.

And it means recognising that the cost of failing to prepare can be vastly greater than the cost of preparing properly.

Social security protects people from hardship. National security protects the country in which those people live.

We need both.

But when the world becomes more dangerous, pretending that strengthening our defences is simply a choice between guns and welfare is not responsible government.

It is a false choice.

A government’s first duty is to keep its people safe.

Everything else depends upon it.

Sudan’s war is no longer contained within Sudan’s borders

Wars are sustained by more than weapons.

They require people, training, money, logistics, transport, territory and the ability to move resources across borders. When those networks become established beyond a country’s borders, the war itself begins to change.

Recent reporting on Ethiopia raises precisely this question for Sudan.

In February, a Reuters investigation reported that Ethiopia was hosting a camp in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, close to Sudan’s border, where thousands of fighters linked to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were reportedly being trained. Reuters also identified new infrastructure at nearby Asosa airport, including facilities associated with drone operations. Sources told Reuters that the United Arab Emirates had financed the camp and provided trainers and logistical support. Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s involvement, and the UAE denied being involved in the conflict.

That might have been viewed as an isolated and deeply concerning development.

The evidence now suggests we should ask a bigger question.

Is Ethiopian territory becoming a rear base for the RSF’s war in Sudan?

In April, Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab reported with high confidence that activity consistent with military assistance to the RSF was taking place at an Ethiopian National Defense Force base in Asosa. Its subsequent assessment found continued activity consistent with support for the RSF, including the movement and modification of light technical vehicles and the presence of transport containers and commercial carriers.

Further reporting has added to the picture.

A March investigation into cargo flights found repeated journeys between the UAE and Ethiopia, while reporting linked the activity to the Ethiopian territory where the RSF training infrastructure had been identified.

And in September, a Sudanese official in Kurmuk alleged that four RSF training facilities were operating inside Ethiopia, including sites allegedly being used for foreign recruitment, drone operations and logistical support. Those specific allegations have not been independently verified, and both Ethiopia and the UAE have rejected previous accusations of facilitating RSF military activity.

But taken together, these developments raise a question that should concern anyone serious about ending Sudan’s war:

What happens when external support stops being a shipment and becomes a system?

A training camp can produce fighters.

A logistics network can move equipment.

An airfield can support operations.

A rear base can allow a force to regroup, rearm and return to the battlefield.

These are not separate questions. They are parts of the infrastructure that can allow a war to continue.

This matters particularly in Blue Nile, where the RSF and allied forces have opened a significant new front along Sudan’s border with Ethiopia. The geography matters. So does the proximity of training, logistics and military infrastructure to an active battlefield.

The issue, therefore, is not simply whether one country is “supporting” one side.

It is whether Sudan’s war is acquiring an external infrastructure capable of sustaining it.

That distinction matters for international policy.

If governments genuinely want to alter the incentives that keep this war going, looking only at the battlefield inside Sudan is no longer sufficient.

They need to examine the routes by which fighters are recruited and trained, the aircraft moving between countries, the bases from which equipment can be staged, the companies and intermediaries facilitating logistics, and the territory that allows combatants to operate beyond Sudan’s borders.

This is what cutting the oxygen of war means in practice.

It means following the war beyond the battlefield.

It means identifying the networks that sustain it.

And it means asking the governments involved — directly or indirectly — what responsibility they bear for allowing those networks to operate.

Sudan’s war does not stop at Sudan’s borders.

Neither should the international effort to stop it.

Dear Secretary Rubio,

You have described Sudan’s war as a tragedy in which several countries are directly supporting the opposing sides — a proxy conflict in which external actors are helping to sustain a war that Sudanese people have already paid an unbearable price for.

You have also said that some countries are allowing their territory to be used to move weapons into Sudan.

And you have made clear that the United States is deeply engaged in trying to bring this war to an end.

So Sudan Futures would like to ask a simple question:

If you know who is helping to fuel this war, why is the international pressure not focused more directly on those external actors?

Why are they not being engaged with at the highest level?

Why are those facilitating weapons, financing recruitment and military support not facing consequences proportionate to the role they are playing?

The United States has imposed sanctions on individuals and networks involved in procurement and recruitment for the war. That is important. But the evidence emerging from international investigations points to something larger: transnational networks and states operating beyond Sudan’s borders are helping to sustain the capacity of the belligerents to continue fighting. (U.S. Department of the Treasury⁠ )

If the war is being sustained from outside Sudan, then pressure on Sudanese actors alone cannot be enough.

There is another question that deserves an answer.

Why should the Sudanese state and its people bear the consequences of measures that can further weaken the country’s institutions, economy and ability to function, while the external networks that help sustain the war remain able to operate?

Sudan is not simply a battlefield.

It is a sovereign country whose people are trying to survive a war that has destroyed homes, livelihoods, infrastructure and communities. The Sudanese economy is collapsing, the currency is under extraordinary pressure, and millions have been displaced. (Reuters⁠ )

The answer cannot be to weaken Sudan further without simultaneously cutting the external supply lines that allow the war to continue.

If Washington believes that there is no military solution to this conflict, then the international community must address the machinery that makes continued military escalation possible.

That means following the money.

Following the weapons.

Following the logistics.

Following the recruitment networks.

And engaging directly with the states and entities that enable them.

The United States has considerable diplomatic and economic leverage. Secretary Rubio, you have said that those supporting the warring parties must use their influence to bring them towards a peace agreement. If that is the case, why should the same principle not apply to those who are helping to sustain the war?

Sudan Futures therefore asks the United States to match its recognition of the international dimensions of this war with a corresponding diplomatic strategy:

Engage those who enable the war.
Pressure those who sustain it.
Sanction those who profit from it.
And protect Sudanese people from measures that further weaken the country they are fighting to keep alive.

Sudan does not need another cycle in which the international community focuses on the symptoms while the sources of the war remain intact.

If you know who is fuelling this war, Secretary Rubio, the question is not whether they should be part of the solution.

It is why they are not already under sufficient pressure to become part of it.

Sudan Futures

There is something fundamentally wrong with the way we are approaching the future of our communities.

When the money is tight, the easiest answer is to take from one place and give to another. Slice the pie a little thinner here, a little thinner there, and tell ourselves that we have made the system fairer.

But if the pie is not growing, all we have done is create new losers.

That is the problem I see with the Government’s Fair Funding Review.

Kensington and Chelsea is facing the removal of more than £100 million from its budgets over four years — more than 40 per cent of the Council’s controllable budget. The Council is warning that the consequences will ultimately be felt through difficult choices about services and council tax. (Kensington and Chelsea Consultation Hub⁠ )

This is not an abstract argument about spreadsheets and funding formulas.

It is about the people who use our services.

It is about an elderly resident who needs care, a family facing homelessness, a disabled child who needs support, a street that needs maintaining, a community facility that keeps people connected.

And it is about the thousands of people who contribute enormously to the economy and the Exchequer but are increasingly being told that the place they live should simply accept less.

The Government argues that its reforms are about directing funding towards areas of greater assessed need. That is a legitimate objective. But fairness cannot simply mean taking from one community to give to another.

Fairness should also mean creating more.

This is where I believe we are missing the bigger opportunity.

Why are we constantly debating how to divide a fixed pot when we should be asking how we make the pot bigger?

Why are we taking from Peter to pay Paul rather than asking how we can help Paul develop his talents, find better opportunities and contribute more?

That is how sustainable communities are built.

We should be looking at growth, enterprise, investment, skills, employment, housing, regeneration and the enormous economic contribution made by London. We should be asking how every community can become more productive and more prosperous — not simply which community should receive a larger slice of a shrinking share.

London is not a problem to be solved by reducing its contribution.

London is one of the country’s greatest economic assets.

And yet London Councils is now warning of a cumulative £5.2 billion funding shortfall for London’s boroughs between now and 2030, with an estimated £1.2 billion gap in this financial year alone. (London Councils⁠ )

That should concern all of us, wherever we live.

Because when councils are forced to make increasingly difficult choices, the impact does not remain neatly inside a council boundary. It affects local economies, jobs, businesses, housing, social care and the quality of the places in which people live.

Where are our MPs?

This is also where I think we need a much more honest conversation about political representation.

Kensington and Bayswater and Chelsea and Fulham have elected MPs who have a responsibility not only to their party but to the communities they represent.

I do not expect every MP to agree with their council.

I do expect them to speak plainly when decisions made by their own Government have consequences for their constituents.

There is a difference between being loyal to a political party and being accountable to the people who elected you.

Our communities deserve MPs who will ask difficult questions, challenge decisions when necessary and make the case for their constituents — even when that is uncomfortable.

Silence is not representation.

Nor is quietly accepting a policy because challenging it may be politically inconvenient.

We need a bigger ambition

I am not arguing that every pound of public money should remain exactly where it is today.

Nor am I arguing that councils should never be expected to reform, find efficiencies or do things differently. Local government must always scrutinise how it spends taxpayers’ money. We have a responsibility to do so.

But there is a difference between reforming a system and simply redistributing scarcity.

If the answer to every difficult financial question is to take money from one community and move it to another, eventually everybody is fighting over a smaller piece of the same pie.

That is not an economic strategy.

It is a redistribution strategy.

We should be much more ambitious.

Grow the economy.

Create opportunities.

Unlock investment.

Help people into work.

Support businesses to expand.

Build the homes and infrastructure that allow communities to thrive.

And give local government the freedom and resources to innovate rather than continually forcing councils into a cycle of cuts, savings and crisis management.

Because communities are not numbers on a funding formula.

They are people, businesses, families, neighbourhoods and aspirations.

And if we really believe in building a fairer country, then surely the ambition should be to create more opportunity for everyone — not simply to decide who gets the smaller piece.

Sudan has had no shortage of statements. What it has lacked is sufficient alignment behind them.

For more than three years, governments and international institutions have called for an end to the war, humanitarian access, respect for Sudan’s sovereignty and an end to external interference.

Yet the war continues.

On 21 September, something potentially more consequential took place in New York.

Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — the four countries that make up the R4 — met on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly and issued a joint position on Sudan.

Their language was clear. They reaffirmed Sudan’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity. They rejected parallel entities that undermine Sudan’s sovereignty and unity. And, significantly, they called for an end to the illicit flow of weapons, mercenaries and foreign fighters into Sudan.

The statement itself is not a strategy. It does not, on its own, change the dynamics of the war.

But it does raise a question that deserves much closer attention:

Could regional alignment finally begin to turn diplomatic consensus on Sudan into meaningful political action?

That is the question Sudan Futures is interested in.

Beyond another statement

Sudan has accumulated no shortage of statements.

Governments, regional organisations and international institutions have repeatedly called for an end to the fighting, humanitarian access, respect for Sudan’s sovereignty and an end to external interference.

Yet the war has continued.

The reason is partly that Sudan’s conflict cannot be understood solely as a conflict between Sudanese armed actors. External relationships, weapons, financing, political support and regional calculations have all become part of the environment in which the war is sustained.

That is why the R4 statement matters.

Not because four governments have said something entirely new about Sudan’s war, but because four countries with significant regional relationships have now placed external military flows directly into their joint statement.

The question is what follows.

Why the R4 matters

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan do not have identical interests in Sudan, nor identical relationships with the parties to the conflict.

That is precisely what makes their coordination worth watching.

The R4 has been meeting since 2025 and has developed into a broader regional consultation mechanism. Its fourth meeting, held in Cairo in June 2026, brought the same four foreign ministers together to discuss regional developments and strengthen coordination.

Its latest meeting in New York therefore represents continuity rather than a new Sudan initiative.

But Sudan has now become an explicit part of that conversation.

This creates an opportunity — if the words can be translated into policy.

What would action look like?

If the flow of weapons, mercenaries and foreign fighters is recognised as part of the problem, then addressing it requires more than repeating that it should stop.

It requires asking:

Where are these flows coming from?

How are they financed and transported?

Which networks facilitate them?

What diplomatic, financial or political leverage can be used to disrupt them?

And, perhaps most importantly:

Are regional governments prepared to use that leverage when doing so conflicts with their own interests?

These are uncomfortable questions. They are also unavoidable ones.

Sudan Futures has argued before that international engagement must move beyond expressions of concern towards policies that alter the incentives sustaining the war.

The R4 statement gives that argument another point of reference.

A regional opportunity — but not yet a strategy

There is a danger in reading too much into one diplomatic statement.

The four governments have not announced a joint enforcement mechanism on Sudan. They have not set out a common sanctions policy. Nor have they announced a new mediation framework.

What they have done is establish a shared position on several fundamental questions — including Sudan’s territorial integrity, opposition to parallel entities and the need to stop external military flows.

That is significant.

But a shared position is not the same as a shared strategy.

And a shared strategy is not the same as implementation.

The distance between the three is where Sudan’s international diplomacy has repeatedly struggled.

The question for the international community

The emergence of stronger regional coordination should not be viewed as a substitute for international action.

It should be used to strengthen it.

If Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are prepared to coordinate around Sudan, there is an opportunity for governments beyond the region to engage with that alignment rather than creating yet another disconnected diplomatic track.

There is also an opportunity to test the seriousness of the commitment.

If the four governments agree that weapons, mercenaries and foreign fighters are helping sustain Sudan’s war, then the next step should be to identify the networks involved and consider what can realistically be done to disrupt them.

That is where diplomacy becomes consequential.

Sudan does not need another declaration that its sovereignty matters.

It needs the international and regional politics surrounding the war to begin changing the calculations that allow the war to continue.

The R4 has put the issue on the table.

The question now is whether it is prepared to do more than name the problem.

Sudan does not lack statements. It needs alignment — and action.

Reports today that the United States has not yet issued General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a visa to attend the UN General Assembly raise a much larger question.

Reuters reports that the visa may be linked to Burhan accepting a proposed 90-day ceasefire. The US has not confirmed that linkage, while the UN says it has raised the matter with Washington.

If confirmed, this would be significant.

For more than three years, Sudan has heard statements, appeals and calls for restraint while the war has continued and external support has helped sustain it.

Diplomacy is not only about statements.

It can also be about leverage.

If diplomatic access can be used to influence the parties to the conflict, then we should also ask what other forms of leverage are available — over arms, financing, political support and the external networks that continue to sustain the war.

Sudan does not lack international engagement.

The question is whether that engagement is being used strategically enough to change the incentives sustaining the conflict.

The tools exist. The question is whether the political will exists to use them.

There is a difficult line in international diplomacy between engaging with an armed group because circumstances require it and treating that group as though it were a legitimate political authority.

Recent meetings in Nairobi involving British and Japanese diplomats and representatives of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces raise precisely this question.

According to Sudan Tribune, the UK’s Special Representative to Sudan, Richard Crowder, met the head of the RSF’s humanitarian agency to discuss civilian protection and aid delivery. British officials stressed that the meeting was practical and did not constitute recognition of a parallel administration.

That distinction matters.

And Sudan Futures does not suggest that humanitarian access should be compromised because of it.

Where an armed group controls territory, international organisations may sometimes have little choice but to communicate with those who control access to civilians.

Access is not recognition.

But the distinction must remain clear.

The RSF is not Sudan’s government.

It is not a parallel state.

And humanitarian necessity should not gradually become political normalisation.

This is particularly important at a time when the international community is debating how to respond to Sudan’s fragmented political and territorial landscape.

There is a danger that repeated international engagement with parallel structures — however practical the original purpose — can gradually give them an appearance of legitimacy.

That is not a theoretical concern.

Sudan’s government has already warned international organisations against engaging with RSF-affiliated institutions, arguing that doing so undermines Sudan’s sovereignty. Sudan Tribune reports that Sudanese officials also cited UN Security Council and African Union positions concerning parallel authorities.

But there is another side to this question.

If the international community refuses all contact with an armed group controlling territory, civilians living under its control may pay the price.

That is why the answer cannot simply be “do not engage.”

The answer is to establish clear boundaries around engagement.

Humanitarian contact should remain humanitarian.

Negotiating access should not become political recognition.

Meeting an armed group to protect aid workers should not be confused with treating it as the legitimate government of Sudan.

And international diplomacy should be transparent about the difference.

This distinction matters because Sudan will eventually have to rebuild a functioning state.

That requires institutions capable of governing the country as a whole.

It requires a political process.

It requires accountable security institutions.

And it requires international engagement that does not inadvertently help institutionalise fragmentation.

The international community should therefore ask itself a simple question each time it engages an armed group:

What is the purpose of this contact — and what message does it send?

If the purpose is humanitarian access, say so clearly.

If the purpose is mediation, define the parameters.

If the purpose is political engagement, then the question of representation and legitimacy becomes unavoidable.

Sudan needs humanitarian access.

It needs diplomacy.

It needs negotiations.

But it also needs clarity.

Practical engagement should not quietly become political recognition.

And in a war where the distinction between the state and armed groups is already being blurred, that clarity matters more than ever.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is in New York this week to address the United Nations General Assembly.

That matters.

Not because appearing at the UN automatically confers legitimacy. The United Nations does not itself recognise governments. But because of the way the international system continues to engage with Sudan.

The UN has repeatedly met Burhan in his capacity as President of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council. Its Secretary-General has described him in those terms and engaged directly with the Sudanese authorities through him.

Reuters is now describing him as Sudan’s head of state and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

So perhaps we need to ask a more fundamental question:

If the international community recognises the Sudanese state and engages with its established state authorities, why does so much international language continue to place the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on the same institutional footing?

The distinction matters.

The Sudanese Armed Forces are Sudan’s national armed forces.

The Rapid Support Forces are a paramilitary organisation.

That does not mean that every action of the SAF is legitimate or beyond scrutiny. It is not.

Allegations of violations by the SAF must be investigated, and where responsibility is established, accountability should follow.

But accountability for conduct is not the same thing as institutional status.

Nor should condemning violations by one side require us to erase the distinction between a state’s national armed forces and a paramilitary force fighting against the state.

This distinction becomes particularly important when international policy is being designed.

If both are simply described as “the warring parties”, it becomes easier to construct policies that treat them as interchangeable.

But they are not interchangeable.

Their origins are different.

Their institutional status is different.

Their relationship with the Sudanese state is different.

And the implications for international policy are different.

This is not an argument for giving the SAF a free pass.

It is an argument for precision.

The international community should be capable of holding the SAF accountable for violations while simultaneously recognising the distinction between Sudan’s national armed forces and the RSF.

It should be capable of demanding humanitarian access from both sides without pretending that both organisations occupy the same constitutional or institutional position.

And it should be capable of imposing targeted consequences on those responsible for atrocities without adopting measures that inadvertently weaken the institutions of the Sudanese state as though they were simply another armed faction.

The distinction also matters beyond the battlefield.

Sudan will eventually have to rebuild a functioning state.

That requires institutions.

It requires an army.

It requires civilian government.

It requires accountable security structures.

And it requires a political settlement that Sudanese people themselves can shape.

If international policy continually treats the state and a paramilitary organisation as equivalent, we risk losing sight of what we are ultimately trying to preserve and rebuild.

A state is not the same thing as an armed group.

And accountability should never require us to pretend that it is.

Burhan’s presence at the United Nations provides an opportunity to ask a wider question.

If the international community continues to engage the Sudanese state through its recognised authorities, shouldn’t its policies and language reflect that distinction more clearly?

Sudan needs accountability.

It needs pressure on those sustaining the war.

It needs protection for its people.

But it also needs a functioning state capable of surviving the war and rebuilding after it.

Those objectives are not contradictory.

They should be part of the same strategy.

This video from the British Office Sudan, filmed at the damaged British Embassy in Khartoum, is a stark reminder of what three years of war has done to Sudan.

The destruction is visible. The human cost is immeasurable.

But the question now is not simply whether the international community recognises the devastation. It is whether international policy can help change the conditions that allow the war to continue.

The UK has repeatedly called for an end to the conflict, protection of civilians and a political process.

The next question is what happens beyond statements.

Who is supplying the weapons?
Who is financing the war?
Who is facilitating the movement of arms and fighters?
And what leverage can governments use to make continuing the war more difficult and more costly?

For the UK Government, this means looking beyond humanitarian response and diplomatic statements towards the external enablers of the conflict.

Sudan Futures has called this cutting the oxygen of war.

Not as a slogan, but as a policy question.

If we want the war to end, we must examine what is allowing it to continue.

Sudan has been discussed in Parliament again.

That matters.

In yesterday’s Westminster Hall debate on Sudan, Sir Iain Duncan Smith made a point that should not need repeating, but clearly does: Sudan has not received enough attention.

He also called on the Government to use every lever available to increase the urgency and help stop the bloodshed.

Those are important words.

But they raise a more difficult question.

What happens when concern is no longer the problem — but action is?

There is now little doubt that Sudan’s war has an external dimension.

The latest findings from the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission have documented foreign weapons, military technology, fighters and logistical support sustaining the conflict. The Mission has identified networks involving the UAE, Chad, Libya and Somalia in support benefiting the RSF, while also noting that its investigation into external support for the Sudanese Armed Forces remains at an earlier stage.

This matters because external support changes the nature of the policy response.

If weapons are crossing borders, investigate the supply chains.

If money is sustaining armed groups, follow the money.

If foreign fighters are being recruited and deployed, identify those networks.

If military technology is being supplied, show who is providing it and impose consequences where the evidence supports them.

And if governments or companies are facilitating these networks, they should expect serious scrutiny.

The UK has already taken some steps.

The Government has sanctioned Colombian mercenaries suspected of involvement in atrocities in Sudan, as well as individuals suspected of supplying weapons to the RSF. It has also recently targeted actors connected to illicit gold networks.

These measures are welcome.

But the question is whether they are enough.

They are not.

Sanctions are most effective when they form part of a wider strategy.

That means identifying the financial architecture behind the conflict, disrupting supply routes, increasing pressure on those facilitating military support and using diplomatic relationships to demand consequences rather than simply expressing concern.

This is where the UK has an opportunity.

Britain has diplomatic relationships, financial influence, intelligence capabilities and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Those are not insignificant tools.

The question is whether we are prepared to use them with sufficient determination.

Sir Iain Duncan Smith has been raising concerns about the relationship between the UAE and the RSF for some time. In Parliament earlier this year, he argued that without external support, the scale of the continuing war would be very different.

That argument deserves serious consideration.

The issue is not whether the UK should abandon diplomacy.

It is whether diplomacy is being used to its full potential.

If the UK has influence, where is it being used?

If the evidence is growing, what further action follows?

And if sanctions are available, why should those sustaining the war believe that the consequences will remain limited?

Sudan does not need another expression of concern.

It needs a strategy that changes the incentives sustaining the war.

The international community now knows considerably more than it did three years ago.

It knows that the conflict is not sustained only by what happens on Sudanese territory.

It knows that external networks matter.

It knows that weapons, money, technology and people cross borders.

And it increasingly knows where some of those networks lead.

The question is no longer simply whether the world knows.

The question is what it is prepared to do with what it knows.

Sudan Futures welcomes every serious effort to keep Sudan on the political agenda.

But keeping Sudan on the agenda cannot be the end point.

Concern must eventually become leverage.

And leverage must eventually produce consequences.

Sudan does not lack attention.
It continues to lack alignment.