Recent media reports suggest that the United Kingdom has hosted a discreet meeting bringing together a range of participants connected to Sudan, including representatives associated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the United Arab Emirates. If accurate, the reports raise important questions about how international diplomacy on Sudan is currently being conducted. sudanindependent.net

Dialogue is not, in itself, a problem.

Conflicts are rarely resolved without difficult conversations involving parties whose actions may be deeply contested. Diplomacy often requires engagement with those who wield influence on the ground, however uncomfortable that may be.

The question is not whether governments should engage.

The question is whether engagement is accompanied by sufficient clarity, consistency, and accountability.

Over the past three years, the international community has become increasingly willing to acknowledge the scale of Sudan’s humanitarian catastrophe. It has convened conferences, issued statements, pledged financial support, and expressed concern over atrocities committed against civilians. The United Kingdom has itself publicly condemned attacks on civilians and has called for those responsible to be held accountable. GOV.UK

Yet diplomacy inevitably raises difficult questions.

How should governments engage with actors accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law?

How should they balance the need for dialogue with the need for accountability?

And how can diplomatic engagement avoid creating the perception that political access is being offered without corresponding expectations or consequences?

These are not easy questions. Nor are they unique to Sudan.

But they deserve to be addressed openly.

Recent reporting has also renewed attention to the wider role of external actors in sustaining Sudan’s conflict. Allegations concerning external support networks continue to emerge from journalists, researchers, and human rights organisations, while governments continue to navigate complex regional relationships. Human Rights Watch

For Sudan Futures, this reinforces a broader point that extends beyond any single meeting.

Sudan’s conflict cannot be understood solely through developments on the battlefield. It is also shaped by regional relationships, diplomatic calculations, financial networks, and external support that influence the incentives of the parties to the conflict.

Engagement and accountability should not be viewed as competing objectives.

Effective diplomacy requires both.

If dialogue is necessary, it should also be transparent about its purpose, consistent with publicly stated principles, and aligned with efforts to reduce violence and protect civilians.

Three years into the conflict, Sudan does not lack diplomatic activity.
It continues to need greater diplomatic alignment.

That remains one of the central challenges facing the international community today.

Yesterday, my UK Parliament petition on Sudan closed with 1,060 signatures.

To every person who signed, shared, encouraged others, contacted their MP, or simply took the time to support it— thank you.

I am especially grateful to those who shared the petition repeatedly, posted it in WhatsApp groups, spoke about it in their communities, and reminded others that democracy only works when people participate.

Together, we reached 1,060 signatures.

I am proud of what we achieved. But I am also left with some difficult questions.

The UK is home to a significant Sudanese community. We have professionals, students, entrepreneurs, academics, healthcare workers, faith leaders and community organisations across the country. We have all witnessed the unimaginable suffering of our families, friends and fellow citizens over the past three years.

Yet our petition finished with 1,060 signatures.

This is not a criticism of those who signed. They did their part.
It is a question for all of us.

Why were we unable to mobilise more people around a simple democratic action that took less than two minutes?

Was it because people never saw the petition?

Did they believe one signature would make no difference?

Have we become overwhelmed by the scale of Sudan’s tragedy, or exhausted by years of conflict and disappointment?

Or do we, as a diaspora, still struggle to organise around shared causes, even when those causes affect our own people?

These are uncomfortable questions, but they are questions we need to ask ourselves honestly.

Signing a petition is not, by itself, going to change UK foreign policy. But it is one of the simplest ways to demonstrate that people care, that an issue matters, and that elected representatives should pay attention.

If we find it difficult to mobilise around something as accessible as a parliamentary petition, what does that say about our ability to influence policy, shape public debate, or advocate effectively for Sudan in the years ahead?

I do not ask these questions to assign blame.

I ask them because I believe we can do better.

Throughout this campaign, I saw extraordinary commitment. Volunteers translated materials, designed graphics, contacted MPs, spoke in mosques and community centres, and shared the petition countless times. That spirit gives me hope.

The challenge now is to build on it.

Advocacy is not measured only by whether a petition reaches 10,000 signatures. It is measured by whether we learn from each campaign, strengthen our networks, and become more organised and more effective the next time.

Perhaps the greatest lesson from this petition is not that we fell short of 10,000 signatures. It is that building a culture of civic participation takes time.

Democracies are strengthened not by one campaign, but by citizens who continue to show up, speak out and participate, even when the outcome is uncertain. That is the culture we must build—for ourselves, for our community, and for the Sudan we hope to build.

Sudan’s future will not be shaped by one petition. But it will be shaped by whether we, wherever we live, choose to engage consistently, work collectively, and use every democratic avenue available to us.

So today, I simply want to say thank you.

Thank you to the 1,060 people who signed.

Thank you to everyone who shared the petition.

Thank you to those who gave their time, their energy and their voice.

The petition has closed.

The work has not.

Recent reporting in The Guardian on testimony provided to Parliament by Nathaniel Raymond raises deeply troubling questions about the international response to Sudan’s war.

According to the reporting, concerns relating to mass atrocities, external support networks, and the role of regional actors may have been understood far earlier and in greater detail than was publicly acknowledged. These allegations deserve careful scrutiny, and any conclusions should be guided by evidence rather than assumption.

Yet regardless of where future investigations lead, the reporting highlights a broader issue that extends beyond any single government or institution.

The question facing policymakers is no longer simply whether sufficient information exists.

The question is what happens when information fails to produce action.

For much of the past three years, international discussion of Sudan has understandably focused on the consequences of the conflict: displacement, hunger, civilian suffering, and the collapse of essential services. These realities demand urgent attention and sustained support.

But wars are not sustained by their consequences.

They are sustained by decisions, incentives, resources, and networks.
This is why debates about external support to the conflict matter. Not because they shift responsibility away from Sudanese actors, but because they help explain why the war has proven so difficult to contain and resolve.

The significance of the recent testimony is therefore not simply the allegations it contains. It is that those allegations reinforce a question that has persisted throughout the conflict: why has there often appeared to be greater willingness to discuss the consequences of the war than the external factors helping to sustain it?

This is not merely a question for one government. Nor is it a question for one country.

It is a challenge for the wider international community.

Over the course of the conflict, numerous reports, investigations, and expert assessments have raised concerns about arms flows, financing networks, sanctions enforcement, and the role of external actors. At the same time, diplomatic engagement has often prioritised managing relationships and maintaining channels of communication.

Diplomacy is necessary. Relationships matter.

But difficult questions do not become less important because they are politically inconvenient.

If anything, they become more important.

Three years into the conflict, Sudan does not suffer from a lack of analysis. The scale of the crisis is well documented. The suffering of civilians is widely recognised. International conferences continue to be convened. Statements continue to be issued.

Yet recognition alone does not alter the course of a conflict.

The central challenge is still the same: whether international policy is willing to confront the factors that continue to sustain the war.

This is particularly important as discussions increasingly turn towards return, recovery, and Sudan’s future beyond the battlefield. Recovery will require more than rebuilding infrastructure. It will require honest reflection on the political choices, international relationships, and policy failures that allowed the conflict to continue for so long.

Sudan’s tragedy has never been a consequence of insufficient information.

Warnings have been issued. Evidence has been gathered. Investigations have been conducted. Briefings have taken place.

The challenge has increasingly been whether governments are prepared to align their policies with what they already know.

Three years into the war, that remains one of the most important unanswered questions.

Sudan does not lack attention. It continues to lack alignment.

This week marks 1,000 days since Sudan was plunged into a war that has devastated its people and hollowed out the state. It is now one of the gravest humanitarian and political crises in the world. Millions have been displaced. Civilians face famine, mass violence, and ethnic cleansing. Entire cities have been scarred beyond recognition. The conflict is no longer just a Sudanese tragedy—it is destabilising an already fragile region.

And yet, after nearly three years, the international response remains staggeringly inadequate. Not because the world does not know what is happening, but because it has repeatedly chosen caution, comfort, and process over action.

Humanitarian Aid Is Not a Strategy
Humanitarian assistance is essential. It saves lives every day in Sudan and must continue. But it cannot, and should not, be treated as a substitute for political action to stop the violence.

The international community has fallen into a dangerous pattern: fund the aid response, issue statements of concern, and avoid the harder task of confronting those driving the war and those enabling it. Aid is expected to compensate for the absence of diplomacy with teeth.

In Sudan, humanitarian access itself is routinely obstructed. Starvation is weaponised. Civilians are trapped between armed actors who face little external pressure. In this context, humanitarian relief—while vital—risks becoming a grim exercise in managing collapse rather than preventing it.

The Quad: A Theatre of Comfort, Not Change
This failure is epitomised by the so-called Quad. What was meant to be a mechanism for coordinated international pressure has instead become a diplomatic comfort blanket.

Meetings are held. Statements are issued. Familiar language about restraint and dialogue is recycled. But the Quad has not altered the behaviour of the warring parties, constrained external interference, or brought Sudan any closer to peace. It functions less as a tool for change and more as a way for the international community to feel that it is “doing something”.

At best, it is ineffective. At worst, it provides political cover for inaction.

The UK’s Self-Imposed Impotence
The UK’s role is particularly dispiriting. Once a serious diplomatic actor on Sudan, it now appears content with self-imposed impotence.

This is most glaring in its failure to exert meaningful pressure on the United Arab Emirates over credible allegations of arms transfers to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These weapons are not abstract policy concerns. They are killing civilians, fuelling ethnic violence, and prolonging a war that has already gone on far too long.

Diplomacy without leverage is not diplomacy—it is theatre. If the UK is unwilling to confront allies when necessary, it should at least be honest about the limits of its influence and ambition.

The False Equivalence at the Heart of International Policy
Much of this paralysis is driven by a persistent and damaging false equivalence between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF.

The SAF are the country’s legitimate national army. They are not beyond criticism, and Sudan’s history gives ample reason for scepticism of military power. But they remain a state institution, rooted—however imperfectly—in the idea of national defence.

What matters most is what Sudanese civilians themselves experience. When the SAF free a village, a town, or a city, people emerge from hiding. They welcome the army. Markets reopen. Families begin, cautiously, to return. There is relief—because order, however fragile, replaces chaos.

When the RSF takes over, the opposite happens. Civilians flee. Entire communities empty overnight. What follows is looting, sexual violence, ethnic targeting, and the systematic destruction of civilian life. RSF control is defined by fear.

This distinction is obvious to Sudanese people. It should be obvious to the international community. Pretending these forces are morally or politically interchangeable does not make diplomacy easier—it makes it dishonest, and it emboldens those who thrive on violence.

A Lesson in Diplomacy for Washington
Meanwhile, recent interventions from Masad Boulos, US President Trump’s senior adviser on Arab and Middle East affairs, have only added to the problem. Diplomacy requires precision, restraint, and an understanding of context—qualities that have been notably absent.

Sudan does not need performative pronouncements or clumsy engagement that emboldens spoilers and sidelines civilians. It needs serious, informed diplomacy that recognises the complexity of the conflict and the responsibility of external actors who are sustaining it.

At a moment when Sudanese civilians are paying the price of global neglect, careless diplomacy is not just unhelpful—it is dangerous.

1,000 Days Is Not Just a Milestone. It Is an Indictment.
One thousand days of war is not simply a tragic anniversary. It is an indictment of an international system that has chosen management over resolution, neutrality over clarity, and rhetoric over responsibility.

Sudan will not be saved by aid alone. It will not be helped by ineffective forums, timid diplomacy, or false equivalences. This war will only end when those with power decide to use it—against the perpetrators, against the arms pipelines, and against the inertia that has allowed this catastrophe to drag on for nearly three years.

The people of Sudan deserve more than sympathy. They deserve action.

Last night, in the IPU Room at the Palace of Westminster, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan formally launched the new report, Rivers of Blood: Escaping from Darfur. The PDF is too large to upload here. If you would like a copy of the report, please leave your email address in the comments and I will send it directly. My remarks are below.

I welcome this report and the powerful testimonies it brings from Darfur. These accounts are devastating, and they must be heard.

But Sudan’s war is not confined to Darfur. Communities in Khartoum, Gezira, the Kordofans and the East are facing the same violence, loss, and displacement. Their voices deserve equal attention.

It is also important to be precise about the role of the Sudanese Armed Forces today. The SAF is now the national army defending Sudan’s territorial integrity, and its actions should not be confused with those of the early 2000s, which operated under a different political leadership and agenda. In the UK, we must avoid applying outdated assumptions that misrepresent the present reality.

We must also ensure we do not appear to stand with one group of victims while overlooking others. All Sudanese civilians — from every region and background — are suffering and deserve recognition, support, and protection.

And we should be mindful of how our focus is understood inside Sudan. A narrow emphasis on Darfur alone can echo the international dynamics that preceded South Sudan’s separation. The UK must avoid unintentionally reinforcing fears of fragmentation or giving weight to divisive narratives.

This report also reinforces the UK’s legal responsibilities under its export controls and the Arms Trade Treaty. The Government must ensure it is not contributing to abuses by urgently reviewing arms exports to the UAE, publishing transparent findings, and applying targeted sanctions where credible evidence shows involvement in violations. If we are serious about ending this war, we must cut the oxygen of armaments that allows it to continue.

www.youtube.com/live/o3-uA1xwusg?t=7223

Preface

These are my full written remarks — the complete version of the speech I prepared.
Only two minutes were permitted for delivery, but the scale, complexity, and urgency of what is happening in Sudan cannot fit into two minutes.

For transparency, accountability, and public record, I am publishing my full text below.

*Full Speech *

People of conscience – Sudanese, African, Arab, the Global South – and every human being who refuses to look away.

Sudan today is the largest mass atrocity in the world – but the world is pretending not to see.

This is not a natural famine.
This is not a tragic accident.
This is not an unfortunate civil war.

This catastrophe has been engineered.
Engineered by the RSF.
Engineered through systematic looting, rape, execution, starvation, and the liquidation of civilian life for profit.

Entire families have been uprooted.
Entire cities have been erased.
Entire food systems have been deliberately destroyed.

This is what is happening to Sudan — in real time.

The RSF is not a political movement.
The RSF is not a legitimate force.
The RSF is a criminal enterprise operating as a militia, whose business model is crimes against humanity.

And let me say this clearly, loudly, and directly to the world:

No one can claim to oppose genocide and still remain silent in front of what the RSF is doing.

And we must also name the enabling system.

The RSF is being financially oxygenated and empowered through the gold laundering economy that flows through the UAE.

Gold stolen from Sudanese soil is turned into clean money inside Dubai.

So, if the world is serious about “never again,”
and if the world is serious about protecting human life,
and if the world is serious about ending atrocity-financed war —

then the world must boycott UAE gold.

The world must sanction and blacklist every refinery, every trader, and every logistics channel that launders Sudanese gold into clean revenue in Dubai — gold stolen through Sudanese suffering.

This is not hostility towards Emirati people.
This is not hate.
This is accountability.

If you stop the gold wash — RSF capacity collapses.

To Sudanese everywhere:

Inside Sudan.
In the region.
In the diaspora.

We do not have the privilege of internal fragmentation anymore.

Political disagreement is normal.
Political diversity is necessary.
Democratic argument is healthy.

But right now, Sudan is not in a normal political moment.

Sudan is in a national survival moment.

And in a national survival moment — unity is not optional.

The SAF is the internationally recognised sovereign national military institution of Sudan.

Supporting SAF in this moment is not a vote for dictatorship.
Supporting SAF in this moment is not a vote against democracy.
Supporting SAF in this moment is a vote for Sudan’s right to continue to exist as a country at all.

After we stop annihilation…
After we stop the RSF threat…
After we secure Sudanese territory and protect Sudanese civilians…

then we return to rebuilding a civilian democratic order — grounded in Sudanese consent, Sudanese participation, and Sudanese legitimacy.

But first — survival.
Sudan cannot democratise when Sudan is being erased.

Final Call

I call on every Sudanese:

to stand together,
to speak with one voice,
to unify our diplomatic lobbying,
and to focus our energy on three strategic objectives: 1. Total international isolation of the RSF 2. Total commercial boycott of UAE gold 3. Consolidation of support behind SAF in this war of national self-defense

We are not begging the world for charity.
We are demanding enforcement of the same laws the world claims to believe in.

If we do this with unity, precision, and discipline —
Sudan survives this chapter.

And when Sudan survives this chapter…
Sudan will write the next one.

A democratic one.
A sovereign one.
A civilian one.
A Sudanese one.

Thank you.

Today marks the creation of South Sudan the newest country in Africa and the 196th sovereign nation. After years of wrangling, fighting and talking the once one million square miles strong and largest country in Africa is today officially split into two independent countries. A million congratulations to all Sudanese on both sides of the border.

Despite what some in the West might want us to believe, this agreement was arrived into amicably and somewhat peacefully – somewhat because the history of the two people is full of conflicts and violent bloodshed. However this particular declaration was achieved peacefully and with mutual agreement.

What about Abyei I hear you ask!?

Like the majority of Africa, Sudan is a tribal nation, even today when a person is introduced the first thing they are asked is where they come from – which tribe and what’s their kin. Sudanese, even the better educated identify and pride themselves by where they came from – it is also extremely important in matters of business, marriage and many social, economic and political issues.

At first glance it might sound alien but if we look closely it’s not all that dissimilar to how the West operates – maybe less sophisticated and more in your face nevertheless not too different. Take politics and the political class for instance – who and where a person is from can equally open and close doors – a Kennedy, a Bush or even a Clinton is not the same as a Palin, an Obama or even a Reagan in the US. An Oxbridge educated upper class with the appropriate contacts and breeding will top any political party list and every opportunity will come their way without the need for any special measures here in the UK!

Abyei is a small region in the heart of Sudan inhabited by two different tribes Dinka who are pure African in origin and culture and the Messeria who are of Arab decent and lead a nomadic life. The two make their living from cattle; both tribes graze their animals around the river basin but also freely travel around the region in dryer seasons for fodder. For years the two lived side by side and existed in a harmonious understanding.

When the Sudan split, the borders cut in the middle of that region separating it into the two countries therefore restricting their movement and their way of life. That’s what the dispute is really and truly about – the inhabitance who for years lived, married shared cultures and yes sometimes fought, don’t want to become separated – but the two governments can’t agree on an amicable resolution. Logic says pronounce Abyei a neutral zone – but I’m sure it’s not that simple – however it can be!

The right and just thing to do will be to allow the two nations – Sudan and South Sudan – resolve this situation and arrive to a peaceful resolution with as little interference as possible from the Church, Muslim Schoolers and of course the oil thirsty states.

Happy Independence Day South Sudan