Recent reporting in The Guardian on testimony provided to Parliament by Nathaniel Raymond raises deeply troubling questions about the international response to Sudan’s war.

According to the reporting, concerns relating to mass atrocities, external support networks, and the role of regional actors may have been understood far earlier and in greater detail than was publicly acknowledged. These allegations deserve careful scrutiny, and any conclusions should be guided by evidence rather than assumption.

Yet regardless of where future investigations lead, the reporting highlights a broader issue that extends beyond any single government or institution.

The question facing policymakers is no longer simply whether sufficient information exists.

The question is what happens when information fails to produce action.

For much of the past three years, international discussion of Sudan has understandably focused on the consequences of the conflict: displacement, hunger, civilian suffering, and the collapse of essential services. These realities demand urgent attention and sustained support.

But wars are not sustained by their consequences.

They are sustained by decisions, incentives, resources, and networks.
This is why debates about external support to the conflict matter. Not because they shift responsibility away from Sudanese actors, but because they help explain why the war has proven so difficult to contain and resolve.

The significance of the recent testimony is therefore not simply the allegations it contains. It is that those allegations reinforce a question that has persisted throughout the conflict: why has there often appeared to be greater willingness to discuss the consequences of the war than the external factors helping to sustain it?

This is not merely a question for one government. Nor is it a question for one country.

It is a challenge for the wider international community.

Over the course of the conflict, numerous reports, investigations, and expert assessments have raised concerns about arms flows, financing networks, sanctions enforcement, and the role of external actors. At the same time, diplomatic engagement has often prioritised managing relationships and maintaining channels of communication.

Diplomacy is necessary. Relationships matter.

But difficult questions do not become less important because they are politically inconvenient.

If anything, they become more important.

Three years into the conflict, Sudan does not suffer from a lack of analysis. The scale of the crisis is well documented. The suffering of civilians is widely recognised. International conferences continue to be convened. Statements continue to be issued.

Yet recognition alone does not alter the course of a conflict.

The central challenge is still the same: whether international policy is willing to confront the factors that continue to sustain the war.

This is particularly important as discussions increasingly turn towards return, recovery, and Sudan’s future beyond the battlefield. Recovery will require more than rebuilding infrastructure. It will require honest reflection on the political choices, international relationships, and policy failures that allowed the conflict to continue for so long.

Sudan’s tragedy has never been a consequence of insufficient information.

Warnings have been issued. Evidence has been gathered. Investigations have been conducted. Briefings have taken place.

The challenge has increasingly been whether governments are prepared to align their policies with what they already know.

Three years into the war, that remains one of the most important unanswered questions.

Sudan does not lack attention. It continues to lack alignment.

Cutting the Oxygen of War

External Enablers, Diplomatic Alignment, and the Future of International Engagement in Sudan

Author: Sudan Futures
Date: June 2026

Executive Summary

Three years into Sudan’s conflict, international attention has increased but remains unevenly translated into political action.

While governments, international organisations, and humanitarian agencies have mobilised significant resources in response to human suffering, less progress has been made in addressing the external factors that continue to sustain the war.

Sudan’s conflict cannot be understood solely through developments on the battlefield. Financial support networks, arms flows, diplomatic positioning, and regional competition all shape the incentives that prolong violence and complicate efforts toward peace.

Recent initiatives, including the Berlin Conference on Sudan, demonstrate renewed international engagement. However, they also reveal a persistent gap between recognition of the conflict’s drivers and the willingness to address them directly.

This brief argues that:

• Life-saving assistance remains indispensable but cannot substitute for political action.
• External enablers require greater scrutiny and accountability.
• International diplomacy must become more coherent and aligned.
• Planning for return, recovery, and governance should begin alongside humanitarian response.
• Sudanese civilian perspectives should play a greater role in shaping international policy discussions.

Introduction

Sudan’s war has generated one of the world’s most severe displacement and protection crises. Millions have been displaced internally and across borders, livelihoods have collapsed, and access to essential services remains severely constrained.

International efforts have understandably focused on immediate aid and relief needs. Yet humanitarian crises do not sustain themselves. They are sustained by political, military, and economic dynamics that extend far beyond the provision of aid.

Three years into the conflict, a central question remains:

Why does international recognition of the crisis continue to outpace international action on the factors sustaining it?

This paper explores that gap.

1. Sudan’s Crisis Is Political as Well as Humanitarian

The civilian consequences of Sudan’s conflict are both visible and urgent.

However, the scale of civilian suffering reflects underlying political realities.

Violence against civilians, displacement, restrictions on humanitarian access, and institutional collapse are not isolated phenomena. They are consequences of a conflict whose incentives remain largely intact.

As a result, needs arising from the conflict continue to expand faster than international efforts to reduce them.

Humanitarian assistance saves lives. It cannot, on its own, change the trajectory of the conflict.

2. The External Dimension of the Conflict

Discussion of Sudan often focuses on domestic actors. Yet the conflict has always had a significant external dimension.

International reporting, expert analysis, and diplomatic discussions have increasingly highlighted concerns regarding:

• arms transfers
• financial support networks
• sanctions enforcement gaps
• regional competition
• political protection afforded to conflict actors

The precise nature and scale of these relationships remain contested in some cases. Nevertheless, growing attention to external enablers reflects recognition that the conflict is not sustained solely by internal dynamics.

A durable reduction in violence is unlikely if the broader ecosystem supporting the conflict remains largely untouched.

3. Diplomacy Without Alignment

International engagement on Sudan has increased over the past year.

Conferences, diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian pledging events, and public statements have all demonstrated continuing concern for the country’s future.

The Berlin Conference represented an important example of this renewed attention.

The conference brought together governments, multilateral institutions, and aid organisations to discuss Sudan’s crisis and mobilise additional support.

Yet the conference also highlighted a broader challenge.

International stakeholders have often proven more successful at mobilising resources than applying coordinated political leverage.

The challenge is no longer simply one of attention.

It is increasingly one of alignment.

Without greater coherence between diplomatic engagement, accountability measures, humanitarian objectives, and regional policy, international efforts risk addressing symptoms more effectively than causes.

4. Looking Beyond the Battlefield: Return and Recovery

As conditions evolve in parts of Sudan, increasing attention will be given to questions of return and recovery.

However, return should not be confused with recovery.

Many Sudanese civilians have lost homes, livelihoods, documentation, educational opportunities, and access to basic services.

Returning populations may face:

• destroyed infrastructure
• limited economic opportunity
• weak local administration
• disrupted education systems
• ongoing insecurity

These challenges raise important policy questions.

How are returnees being supported?

What planning exists for local recovery?

How can international assistance help rebuild capacity rather than simply respond to crisis?

These issues deserve greater attention now, rather than after the conflict formally ends.

5. Policy Recommendations

Recommendation 1

Increase scrutiny of external enablers of the conflict.

Governments should strengthen monitoring, transparency, and accountability relating to arms transfers, financing networks, and sanctions enforcement.

Recommendation 2

Improve coordination between diplomatic initiatives.

International efforts should prioritise coherence across bilateral, regional, and multilateral engagement.

Recommendation 3

Align humanitarian and political strategies.

Humanitarian assistance should remain independent and impartial while being accompanied by broader efforts to address conflict drivers.

Recommendation 4

Begin planning for recovery and return now.

International partners should support assessments and planning related to housing, education, documentation, livelihoods, and local governance.

Recommendation 5

Broaden engagement with Sudanese civilian expertise.

Policy discussions should draw more consistently on Sudanese expertise, civil society, professional networks, and local knowledge.

Conclusion

Three years into the conflict, Sudan does not suffer from a lack of awareness.

The scale of the crisis is well documented. The scale of civilian suffering is widely recognised. Diplomatic engagement continues.

Yet recognition alone does not alter the course of a conflict.

Sudan’s war is sustained not only by violence on the battlefield, but also by external networks that finance, arm, and politically enable the conflict.

Until international engagement becomes more aligned with that reality, humanitarian needs are likely to continue outpacing political action.

Sudan does not lack attention. It continues to lack alignment.

Over the past three years, Sudan has experienced one of the world’s most devastating conflicts. Millions have been displaced, countless lives have been disrupted, and entire communities have been forced to navigate a future shaped by war.

Throughout this period, international concern has often been evident. Yet concern has not always translated into effective action.

It was this gap between awareness and action that led to the creation of Sudan Futures.

Sudan Futures is an independent policy initiative focused on Sudan. Its purpose is simple: to contribute to more effective international engagement by encouraging greater scrutiny of the factors sustaining the conflict, supporting clearer policy thinking, and helping ensure that civilian protection remains at the centre of international discussions.

Sudan Futures is not a humanitarian organisation, a political movement, or a campaigning platform. It seeks instead to operate in the space between analysis and action, producing practical policy reflections that help inform decision-making. The initiative is guided by three broad themes:

• examining external enablers of the conflict;
• encouraging governments to move beyond statements towards meaningful leverage; and
• promoting greater clarity and accountability in international engagement.

At the same time, Sudan Futures recognises that attention must increasingly turn towards questions of recovery, return, and governance. The future of Sudan will be shaped not only by how the war ends, but by what follows.

The first Sudan Futures publication will be released shortly. Titled Cutting the Oxygen of War, it explores the role of external enablers in sustaining the conflict and argues for a more aligned international response.

The brief reflects a simple observation. While international attention to Sudan has grown, significant gaps remain between recognition of the conflict’s drivers and the policies adopted in response to them.

Sudan does not lack attention. It continues to lack alignment.

I hope Sudan Futures can make a small but meaningful contribution to closing that gap.

Walaa Idris

Founder, Sudan Futures

It is a huge honour to have been re-elected for a third term as a Brompton and Hans Town councillor for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. I am deeply grateful that residents have once again placed their trust in me to represent them, and I remain as committed as ever to being a strong voice for our community.

This term I will continue serving on the Planning Applications Committee and will also join Licensing. These are areas where many of the decisions that shape daily life in our borough are made — from protecting the character of our neighbourhoods to ensuring our high streets and public spaces work for residents first. I have always believed that real influence comes not from titles, but from delivering for the people who elected you, and that will continue to be my focus every single day.

One of my biggest ambitions for this term remains the regeneration and revival of Beauchamp Place — something I have championed from the very beginning and have been working on for the past three years.

Beauchamp Place is one of the most historic and distinctive streets in our borough. Long known for its character, independent spirit and unique place within Knightsbridge, it has for generations been a destination in its own right — a street with an identity residents are proud of and visitors remember.

Over the past three years, we have worked closely with residents, businesses and local stakeholders to shape a vision for the future of the street — one that respects its heritage while recognising the need for renewal and investment. There is a real opportunity to breathe new life into Beauchamp Place and ensure it remains vibrant, attractive and economically strong for years to come.

But anyone who cares about the area knows that revitalising a street like Beauchamp Place is not straightforward. Over the past three years we have faced challenge after challenge — from competing interests and changing economic pressures to the practical realities of delivering meaningful improvements in a busy part of London. One of the biggest obstacles has been the engineering complexity involved, particularly the depth of the pavements and the challenges this creates for redesigning and upgrading the street properly. Despite those difficulties, I have never lost sight of the goal.

I have always believed Beauchamp Place deserves better, and I remain absolutely determined to see this regeneration delivered during this term.

This is not about flashy projects or change for the sake of change. It is about giving the street the attention, care and long-term vision it deserves: making it cleaner, greener, safer and more welcoming, while protecting the character that makes it special in the first place. Done properly, we can restore confidence in the area, support local businesses and create a street that residents can once again feel proud of.

Residents know this has never been a passing interest or a political slogan for me. I have consistently pushed for the regeneration of Beauchamp Place because I genuinely believe in its future and in the importance of investing in the places that define our community. This term, I want to turn that vision into reality.

I am proud of what we have achieved together so far, and I remain excited and determined about what comes next for Brompton and Hans Town.

The recent international conference on Sudan in Berlin was a welcome moment of renewed attention. At a time when the war is entering its third year, sustained engagement from the international community is both necessary and overdue.

The mobilisation of funding, and the recognition of the scale of the crisis, matter. Needs in Sudan remain immense, and support for those affected must continue.

The conference brought together representatives from over fifty countries, alongside major international institutions and humanitarian organisations. Yet notably absent were the parties to the conflict themselves. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces were not present. This underlines a broader limitation: while international stakeholders are able to convene, fund, and coordinate among themselves, their ability — or willingness — to influence the dynamics driving the war is still far less clear.

The conference also highlighted a more persistent problem.

Once again, the international response appears more effective at mobilising resources than at mobilising political action. While there was acknowledgment of the role of external enablers and the need to address arms flows, this did not translate into clear or coordinated measures to disrupt them.

This gap is not new — but it is becoming harder to justify.

A war that is financed, supplied, and politically enabled cannot be meaningfully addressed through funding alone. Without greater clarity and consistency in how external enablers are approached, the underlying incentives sustaining the conflict are unlikely to shift.
At the same time, another dimension of the crisis is beginning to emerge.

As conditions change in parts of Sudan, some civilians are attempting to return. But return does not mean recovery. Many are going back to areas where infrastructure has collapsed, services are limited or non-existent, and livelihoods have been entirely destroyed.

For those who have lost homes, income, and community networks, starting over is not simply a question of resilience — it is a question of support.

What mechanisms are in place to assist those returning?
How are their needs being assessed and prioritised?
And how does the international response plan to move beyond emergency assistance towards supporting longer-term recovery?

These questions remain largely unanswered.

If the focus remains overwhelmingly on immediate relief, without equal attention to political drivers and early recovery, there is a risk that return becomes another phase of vulnerability rather than a pathway to stability.

The Berlin conference was an important moment. It also underscored the limits of the current approach.

Sudan does not lack attention, nor does it lack resources. What it continues to lack is alignment between humanitarian response, political action, and longer-term recovery.

Until that alignment is achieved, progress will remain partial — and fragile.

As Sudan’s war approaches its third year, the scale of devastation is no longer in question. Millions have been displaced. Entire communities have been uprooted. Civilians continue to face violence, hunger, and profound uncertainty about their future.

The international response, while vital, remains a response to consequences — not causes.
Humanitarian crises do not sustain themselves. They are sustained.

The more difficult question is this: why has the international response remained so limited in addressing the forces that sustain the conflict?

From the outset, it has been clear that this war is not self-contained. It has been financed, supplied, and politically enabled. Yet efforts to meaningfully disrupt those external lifelines have been hesitant, fragmented, and often secondary to aid mobilisation.

Soft power — diplomatic engagement, political pressure, and the use of existing leverage — has not been deployed with sufficient urgency or clarity. Where there have been opportunities to press for restraint, transparency, and accountability, they have too often been approached cautiously or inconsistently.

This raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: what explains the gap between what is known about the drivers of the conflict and what is being done to address them?

A similar pattern can be seen in how the war itself is framed.

Darfur rightly commands attention, given the scale and historical significance of the atrocities committed there. But the conflict is not confined to Darfur, and the suffering is not limited to one region. Across Sudan, communities have experienced displacement, violence, and collapse of basic services — often with far less visibility or international recognition.

A more balanced understanding of the conflict is not simply a matter of fairness; it is essential for effective policy. Selective attention risks distorting both analysis and response.

There is also a longer-term cost to the current approach.

Decisions taken outside Sudan — even those not directly related to the conflict — are shaping the country’s future. The tightening of student visa policies in the United Kingdom, for example, has had a direct impact on Sudanese students, many of whom are now unable to continue or complete their studies.

At a moment when Sudan will ultimately require a generation equipped to rebuild institutions, govern effectively, and engage internationally, restricting educational pathways risks undermining the very capacity the country will need in the years ahead.

Three years on, Sudan’s crisis is not only a civilian crisis. It is a test of whether the international community is willing to align its actions with its stated commitments.

Humanitarian assistance must continue. But it cannot substitute for political action.

Unless the external enablers of the conflict are addressed, and unless international engagement becomes more consistent, more balanced, and more purposeful, the trajectory of the war is unlikely to change.

Sudan does not suffer from a lack of awareness. It suffers from a lack of alignment between knowledge and action.

That gap is where the failure lies.

This week marks 1,000 days since Sudan was plunged into a war that has devastated its people and hollowed out the state. It is now one of the gravest humanitarian and political crises in the world. Millions have been displaced. Civilians face famine, mass violence, and ethnic cleansing. Entire cities have been scarred beyond recognition. The conflict is no longer just a Sudanese tragedy—it is destabilising an already fragile region.

And yet, after nearly three years, the international response remains staggeringly inadequate. Not because the world does not know what is happening, but because it has repeatedly chosen caution, comfort, and process over action.

Humanitarian Aid Is Not a Strategy
Humanitarian assistance is essential. It saves lives every day in Sudan and must continue. But it cannot, and should not, be treated as a substitute for political action to stop the violence.

The international community has fallen into a dangerous pattern: fund the aid response, issue statements of concern, and avoid the harder task of confronting those driving the war and those enabling it. Aid is expected to compensate for the absence of diplomacy with teeth.

In Sudan, humanitarian access itself is routinely obstructed. Starvation is weaponised. Civilians are trapped between armed actors who face little external pressure. In this context, humanitarian relief—while vital—risks becoming a grim exercise in managing collapse rather than preventing it.

The Quad: A Theatre of Comfort, Not Change
This failure is epitomised by the so-called Quad. What was meant to be a mechanism for coordinated international pressure has instead become a diplomatic comfort blanket.

Meetings are held. Statements are issued. Familiar language about restraint and dialogue is recycled. But the Quad has not altered the behaviour of the warring parties, constrained external interference, or brought Sudan any closer to peace. It functions less as a tool for change and more as a way for the international community to feel that it is “doing something”.

At best, it is ineffective. At worst, it provides political cover for inaction.

The UK’s Self-Imposed Impotence
The UK’s role is particularly dispiriting. Once a serious diplomatic actor on Sudan, it now appears content with self-imposed impotence.

This is most glaring in its failure to exert meaningful pressure on the United Arab Emirates over credible allegations of arms transfers to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These weapons are not abstract policy concerns. They are killing civilians, fuelling ethnic violence, and prolonging a war that has already gone on far too long.

Diplomacy without leverage is not diplomacy—it is theatre. If the UK is unwilling to confront allies when necessary, it should at least be honest about the limits of its influence and ambition.

The False Equivalence at the Heart of International Policy
Much of this paralysis is driven by a persistent and damaging false equivalence between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF.

The SAF are the country’s legitimate national army. They are not beyond criticism, and Sudan’s history gives ample reason for scepticism of military power. But they remain a state institution, rooted—however imperfectly—in the idea of national defence.

What matters most is what Sudanese civilians themselves experience. When the SAF free a village, a town, or a city, people emerge from hiding. They welcome the army. Markets reopen. Families begin, cautiously, to return. There is relief—because order, however fragile, replaces chaos.

When the RSF takes over, the opposite happens. Civilians flee. Entire communities empty overnight. What follows is looting, sexual violence, ethnic targeting, and the systematic destruction of civilian life. RSF control is defined by fear.

This distinction is obvious to Sudanese people. It should be obvious to the international community. Pretending these forces are morally or politically interchangeable does not make diplomacy easier—it makes it dishonest, and it emboldens those who thrive on violence.

A Lesson in Diplomacy for Washington
Meanwhile, recent interventions from Masad Boulos, US President Trump’s senior adviser on Arab and Middle East affairs, have only added to the problem. Diplomacy requires precision, restraint, and an understanding of context—qualities that have been notably absent.

Sudan does not need performative pronouncements or clumsy engagement that emboldens spoilers and sidelines civilians. It needs serious, informed diplomacy that recognises the complexity of the conflict and the responsibility of external actors who are sustaining it.

At a moment when Sudanese civilians are paying the price of global neglect, careless diplomacy is not just unhelpful—it is dangerous.

1,000 Days Is Not Just a Milestone. It Is an Indictment.
One thousand days of war is not simply a tragic anniversary. It is an indictment of an international system that has chosen management over resolution, neutrality over clarity, and rhetoric over responsibility.

Sudan will not be saved by aid alone. It will not be helped by ineffective forums, timid diplomacy, or false equivalences. This war will only end when those with power decide to use it—against the perpetrators, against the arms pipelines, and against the inertia that has allowed this catastrophe to drag on for nearly three years.

The people of Sudan deserve more than sympathy. They deserve action.

Last night, in the IPU Room at the Palace of Westminster, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan formally launched the new report, Rivers of Blood: Escaping from Darfur. The PDF is too large to upload here. If you would like a copy of the report, please leave your email address in the comments and I will send it directly. My remarks are below.

I welcome this report and the powerful testimonies it brings from Darfur. These accounts are devastating, and they must be heard.

But Sudan’s war is not confined to Darfur. Communities in Khartoum, Gezira, the Kordofans and the East are facing the same violence, loss, and displacement. Their voices deserve equal attention.

It is also important to be precise about the role of the Sudanese Armed Forces today. The SAF is now the national army defending Sudan’s territorial integrity, and its actions should not be confused with those of the early 2000s, which operated under a different political leadership and agenda. In the UK, we must avoid applying outdated assumptions that misrepresent the present reality.

We must also ensure we do not appear to stand with one group of victims while overlooking others. All Sudanese civilians — from every region and background — are suffering and deserve recognition, support, and protection.

And we should be mindful of how our focus is understood inside Sudan. A narrow emphasis on Darfur alone can echo the international dynamics that preceded South Sudan’s separation. The UK must avoid unintentionally reinforcing fears of fragmentation or giving weight to divisive narratives.

This report also reinforces the UK’s legal responsibilities under its export controls and the Arms Trade Treaty. The Government must ensure it is not contributing to abuses by urgently reviewing arms exports to the UAE, publishing transparent findings, and applying targeted sanctions where credible evidence shows involvement in violations. If we are serious about ending this war, we must cut the oxygen of armaments that allows it to continue.

www.youtube.com/live/o3-uA1xwusg?t=7223

Preface

These are my full written remarks — the complete version of the speech I prepared.
Only two minutes were permitted for delivery, but the scale, complexity, and urgency of what is happening in Sudan cannot fit into two minutes.

For transparency, accountability, and public record, I am publishing my full text below.

*Full Speech *

People of conscience – Sudanese, African, Arab, the Global South – and every human being who refuses to look away.

Sudan today is the largest mass atrocity in the world – but the world is pretending not to see.

This is not a natural famine.
This is not a tragic accident.
This is not an unfortunate civil war.

This catastrophe has been engineered.
Engineered by the RSF.
Engineered through systematic looting, rape, execution, starvation, and the liquidation of civilian life for profit.

Entire families have been uprooted.
Entire cities have been erased.
Entire food systems have been deliberately destroyed.

This is what is happening to Sudan — in real time.

The RSF is not a political movement.
The RSF is not a legitimate force.
The RSF is a criminal enterprise operating as a militia, whose business model is crimes against humanity.

And let me say this clearly, loudly, and directly to the world:

No one can claim to oppose genocide and still remain silent in front of what the RSF is doing.

And we must also name the enabling system.

The RSF is being financially oxygenated and empowered through the gold laundering economy that flows through the UAE.

Gold stolen from Sudanese soil is turned into clean money inside Dubai.

So, if the world is serious about “never again,”
and if the world is serious about protecting human life,
and if the world is serious about ending atrocity-financed war —

then the world must boycott UAE gold.

The world must sanction and blacklist every refinery, every trader, and every logistics channel that launders Sudanese gold into clean revenue in Dubai — gold stolen through Sudanese suffering.

This is not hostility towards Emirati people.
This is not hate.
This is accountability.

If you stop the gold wash — RSF capacity collapses.

To Sudanese everywhere:

Inside Sudan.
In the region.
In the diaspora.

We do not have the privilege of internal fragmentation anymore.

Political disagreement is normal.
Political diversity is necessary.
Democratic argument is healthy.

But right now, Sudan is not in a normal political moment.

Sudan is in a national survival moment.

And in a national survival moment — unity is not optional.

The SAF is the internationally recognised sovereign national military institution of Sudan.

Supporting SAF in this moment is not a vote for dictatorship.
Supporting SAF in this moment is not a vote against democracy.
Supporting SAF in this moment is a vote for Sudan’s right to continue to exist as a country at all.

After we stop annihilation…
After we stop the RSF threat…
After we secure Sudanese territory and protect Sudanese civilians…

then we return to rebuilding a civilian democratic order — grounded in Sudanese consent, Sudanese participation, and Sudanese legitimacy.

But first — survival.
Sudan cannot democratise when Sudan is being erased.

Final Call

I call on every Sudanese:

to stand together,
to speak with one voice,
to unify our diplomatic lobbying,
and to focus our energy on three strategic objectives: 1. Total international isolation of the RSF 2. Total commercial boycott of UAE gold 3. Consolidation of support behind SAF in this war of national self-defense

We are not begging the world for charity.
We are demanding enforcement of the same laws the world claims to believe in.

If we do this with unity, precision, and discipline —
Sudan survives this chapter.

And when Sudan survives this chapter…
Sudan will write the next one.

A democratic one.
A sovereign one.
A civilian one.
A Sudanese one.

Thank you.